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R1071and asymmetric cell division, keeping
centrosome size under tight control is
clearly not a bad idea!
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to Recognize EmotionsOur understanding of how we simulate other people’s actions and feelings to
recognize their emotional states is extended by a new study which finds that
premotor and somatosensory cortices are required to process the emotional
meaning of sounds.Ralph Adolphs
Do we know what we think or
intend by observing what we say
or do? The novelist E.M. Forster
and painter Robert Motherwell
thought so, and William James
popularized it for the case of emotions
as well, which he thought of as bodily
expressions that we come to know
about by feeling them. Cognitive
neuroscience has provided
considerable support for this view
and shown that we can use the same
mechanism also to know the
emotions of others: recognizing
emotions from looking at somebody’s
facial expressions has been shown
to require the somatosensory
cortices [1,2].A new piece of the puzzle has now
been provided by Banissy et al. [3],
whose work shows that
somatosensory and premotor cortices
are required also to recognize emotion
from nonverbal auditory stimuli.
The finding is important for several
reasons. First, it demonstrates the
ubiquity of a ‘simulation’ mechanism
in understanding other people’s
emotions, whether it be from body
postures, facial expressions, or voice.
Second, in showing anatomical overlap
with regions also known to participate
in recognizing emotions from facial
expressions, it suggests that there
may be a modality-independent
representation of emotion in
somatomotor cortices: they form
the substrate of our very concept ofemotions. Third and relatedly, it
seems unlikely that somatomotor
cortices are merely representing the
way somebody’s vocal tract and
mouth feel when they are producing
emotional sounds. Instead,
activity in these regions may
comprehensively represent the state
of the body of somebody experiencing
the emotion associated with the
sound. While prior studies [4,5]
have broadly suggested that right
frontoparietal cortices are required
for auditory emotion recognition,
they used different types of stimuli
(prosody in speech) and did not yet
find a clear role for somatosensory
cortex.
The new experiment [3] used a
particular type of transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS),
continuous theta-burst stimulation, to
reduce neural activity over the right
premotor and postcentral cortex for
a few minutes. During that time,
participants were asked to judge if two
emotional voices expressed the same
emotion or not (four emotions were
used: amusement, sadness, fear,
or disgust). TMS resulted in longer
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demonstrating that processing was
compromised. The impairment was
not seen when the judgment was
about the identity of the person from
the voice, even when such identity
judgments were made quite sensitive
and difficult in a separate task. By
using TMS, the authors were able to
conclude that somatomotor cortices
have a causal role in vocal emotion
recognition.
The results lack the resolution to
determine whether there are so-called
‘mirror neurons’ in the regions
responsible for the effect: do the same
neurons represent our own emotional
states and those of others? Mirror
neurons were first defined as cells
that fire during a monkey’s execution
of a goal-directed action and its
observation of another monkey or
person performing the identical action.
Such cells have recently been found
in the human brain as well, and they
appear to be present, albeit in relatively
low proportion, in many cortical
regions and to respond to many
different kinds of actions, including
those that constitute emotional
expressions [6].
Are the present results specific to
nonverbal vocal emotional stimuli?
A lesion study [4] investigating
emotion recognition from prosody
(the emotional modulation of speech)
also found right premotor regions to
be critical, but failed to find a clear
role for right somatosensory cortex;
another study [7] found that lesions
to right somatosensory cortex
impaired the ability to experience
emotions from music, but only slightly
reduced the ability to recognize the
intended emotion. A number of
studies all support the idea that
emotion recognition from a variety of
stimuli (facial expressions, body
postures, prosody) involve right
somatosensory cortices, but other
brain regions are also variably
involved [8]. This heterogeneity,
together with the typically
correlational results from using
methods such as functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), leave it an
important open question which brain
structures are required to process
particular modality-dependent types
of emotional signals, and which are
truly multimodal.
It remains unclear at what point in
time sensorimotor cortices come into
play. TMS either to premotor cortex orto somatosensory cortex resulted in
equivalent disruption of emotion
recognition in Banisy et al.’s study [3],
suggesting that both action and
sensory representations are required
when we simulate another person’s
emotional state; one would expect
them to be engaged in sequence.
For instance, studies using
magnetoencephalography have
suggested that somatosensory
cortices may come online around
300 ms after stimulus onset, once
considerable sensory processing has
been achieved and the stimulus has
been associated with its emotional
valence to some degree [9]. There is
also the need for a more fine-grained
anatomical mapping — current views
argue that only somatosensory
cortical areas BA1 and BA2 (as well
as secondary somatosensory cortex)
are engaged when we simulate
others, whereas BA3 (primary
somatosensory cortex) may be
dedicated to representing only actual
sensations at one’s own body
surface [10].
There are several further questions
raised by the new study [3]. While
reaction times were altered by the
TMS as described above, accuracy
on the task was unchanged. This
may suggest that disruption of
somatomotor cortices was
incomplete; it may also suggest
alternative, slower mechanisms
through which we can figure out how
people feel, raising a challenge for
how to view ‘simulation’ accounts. Are
they the whole story, a big part of the
story, or a small part of the story? If
they are less than the whole story,
a further question is whether different
people rely on simulation to varying
degrees. Perhaps simulation is one
strategy amongst many to gain
knowledge of others’ emotions, and
perhaps there are individual
differences in the extent to which this
particular strategy is deployed. This
will be an important direction for
future studies, especially in light of
findings that this mechanism is
compromised in certain disorders,
such as autism [11].
Another recent study suggests [12]
that there may be at least one other
set of processes: vocal, facial, and
body-posture expressions of emotion
were all found to activate sectors of
medial prefrontal cortex and superior
temporal sulcus, regions thought
to mediate ‘theory of mind’. Takentogether, the two studies [3,12]
resurrect older debates in philosophy
and psychology about whether we use
more abstract reasoning or simulation
to figure out the internal states of
other people. As is usual in such
debates, the answer is likely to be
‘both’, and neuroscientists will be
kept in business by figuring out to
what extent, under what conditions,
and for what personality of the
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